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e Role of Proactive Adaptation in
International Climate Change Mitigation Agreements
Kelly Chloe de Bruin,* Hans-Peter Weikard† and Rob Dellink‡
Abstract
is paper investigates the role of proactive adaptation in international mitigation coalition formation.
Adaptation is introduced into a three stage cartel game of coalition formation. We analytically derive the
optimal level of mitigation and proactive adaptation for the singletons and coalition members. We intro-
duce the -model which is constructed based on the model, which is an applied three-stage
cartel formationmodel with  heterogenous regions. Simulating all possible coalitions () and check-
ing for internal and external stability, we investigate how diﬀerent levels of proactive adaptation will aﬀect
the payoﬀs inGrand coalition and the incentives to freeride.We examinewhich stable coalitions are found
with diﬀerent levels of proactive adaptation and whether regions can gain from overadaptation in the best
performing stable coalition.We ĕnd that though payoﬀs increase in the Grand coalition with lower adapt-
ation, incentives to leave increase. Coalition members can increase their payoﬀs through overadaptation.
 Introduction
Game theoretical analyses are used to study the formation and stability of International Environmental
Agreements (s) on climate change. In this analysis we apply non-cooperative game theory, assuming
that regions act in rational self-interest and there is no supranational authority to impose obligations on
regions. An agreement needs to be self-enforcing (McEvoy and Stranlund ) to be successful (Hoel
). A self enforcing agreement should be stable. A coalition is considered stable if it adheres to both
internal and external stability (d’Aspremont et al. ; Barrett ; Hoel ). Internal stability holds
when no member region within the coalition wishes to leave the coalition. External stability holds when
no non-member region outside the coalition wishes to join the coalition. In the literature it is found that
only small coalitions or coalitions with few beneĕts are stable.
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
s focus on mitigation. rough adaptation, however, regions can also decrease the level of climate
change damages they face. rough adjustments in social or economic systems regions can moderate
potential damages or beneĕt from opportunities associated with climate change (Smit et al. ). An
important diﬀerence between these two measures is that mitigation is a public good whereas adaptation
is a private good.
In the literature on s adaptation is not explicitly considered, but implicitly included in the damage
function; or not considered at all. In fact, the only cases where it is mentioned are in Barrett () and
Zehaie (). Barrett assumes that players ĕrst choose whether or not to join a coalition aer which they
set their adaptation levels. As adaptation is chosen aer the coalition formation process it will have no
eﬀect on the process as any threats of higher (or lower) levels of adaptation will not be credible.
Zehaie () studies the strategic role of adaptation in a two-stage two-player model where regions
in the ĕrst stage of the game invest in adaptation and in the second stage choose their mitigation levels.
He ĕnds that adaptation can have a strategic role when the two regions do not cooperate and when the
two regions cooperate on mitigation only. Increased irreversible investments in adaptation in one region
decreases the need for mitigation in that region, increasing the level of mitigation in the second region.
ere are several limitations to the Zehaie ()'s study. Firstly, he only considers two regions, whereas
any climate coalition would include many players. Secondly, he does not consider how adaptation will
aﬀect the coalition formation and stability. irdly, he does not consider a sharing rule for the bene-
ĕts of the mitigation cooperation. Fourthly, though he can show theoretically that adaptation can have a
strategic eﬀect, whether this is in fact possible in practice remains undetermined. For overinvestment of
proactive adaptation to be worthwhile the beneĕts need to outweigh the costs. Parameter estimates of ad-
aptation and mitigation costs and beneĕts are needed to understand if in fact adaptation can strategically
aﬀect mitigation choices. Finally, Zehaie, like Barrett, treats adaptation as a homogeneous issue, without
considering the varying forms of adaptation and the roles they can play. In this paper we address these
issues.
Based on their timing, adaptation measures can be categorised as either proactive (anticipatory) or re-
active. Proactive adaptation refers to adaptationmeasures taken before climate change occurs.esemeas-
ures are oen large scale and irreversible. Reactive adaptation takes place in reaction to climate change
where costs and beneĕts are felt simultaneously. To illustrate these diﬀerent forms of adaptation we use an
example. Heat and droughts associated with climate change will cause increasing amounts of crops to fail.
To limit the losses both reactive and anticipatory adaptation can be applied. Reactive adaptation options
include using more water (where irrigation systems are in place), changes to other more heat resistant
crop types or changing the planting times of the crops. Proactive adaptation measures include invest-
ments in irrigation systems or investments in the development of diﬀerent more heat resistant crop types.
Adaptation investments which are irreversible, such as proactive adaptation, limit the amount of climate
change damages for a region far into the future. An adaptation capital is built up of which the beneĕts will
be reaped in the future. Such an investment changes the damages of climate change for a region thereby
changing its business as usual damages and mitigation level. is may give a region a strategic advantage
in an  game.

Adaptation as described in Barrett () that takes place aer the coalition formation process or
can be adjusted aer the formation process is comparable to reactive adaptation. Irreversible adaptation
investments as described in Zehaie () are comparable to the proactive (stock) adaptation. We distin-
guish between these two forms of adaptation in our analysis of mitigation coalition formation. Reactive
adaptation will have no eﬀects on the coalition formation process and we can implicitly include this ad-
aptation in the damage function.
We present a three-stage non-cooperative cartel game of coalition formation, where in the ĕrst stage
the level of proactive adaptation is chosen. In the second stage (the coalition formation stage) regions
choose whether to join a unique coalition or not. e third stage of the game is a transboundary mit-
igation game, where mitigation and reactive adaptation levels are set to maximise pay-oﬀs. In this stage
the coalition acts as a single player maximising coalition beneĕts. e model can then be solved for the
optimal levels of proactive adaptation andmitigation using backward induction. An analytic solution can,
however, only be found given a coalition.
We, therefore, introduce an applied model (-) which incorporates adaptation into the exist-
ing  model. is model checks all possible coalitions () between  geo-political regions for
external and internal stability to ĕnd stable coalitions. We use this model to examine the eﬀects of diﬀer-
ent levels of proactive adaptation. Regions will need to set their level of adaptation beforehand without
the knowledge of which coalition will be formed. us, though the model does not include uncertainty
there is uncertainty over which coalition will form.
Applying -, we ĕrst study what eﬀects the diﬀerent levels of adaptation will have on the in-
centives to withdraw from the Grand Coalition () . Secondly, we study the best performing stable co-
alition and investigate whether over-adaptation or under-adaptation by a single region can be used to
increase its payoﬀs.
In the second sectionwe introduce our three-stage game theoreticalmodel. Using backward induction
the optimal level of proactive adaptation and mitigation are found for both coalition members and non-
members. In the third section a numericalmodel (-) is introducedwhich incorporates adaptation
into the existing  model. e fourth section presents our results and the ĕnal section concludes.
 Model
In this paper, we interpret  formation as a coalitional game between heterogeneous regions. We model
this interaction as an extensive form game played in three stages. In the ĕrst stage regions choose their
proactive adaptation levels simultaneously. Given this in the second stage regions choose whether to join
a coalition or not. Here coalition is understood as a binding agreement, where multi-coalitions are not
possible. In the ĕnal stage regions set their mitigation levels. e three stages are referred to as:
. Proactive adaptation stage (protection)
. Coalition formation stage (ratiĕcation)
. Transboundary pollution game (mitigation)

ere is a ĕnite set of players (regions) jN j  3. If there is a coalition with signatories, S N , if there
is no coalition, S = ;. Regions are denoted by i where i 2N .
If a region acts as a singleton it maximises its individual net beneĕts, i.e. minimises the sum of its
individual climate change damages, adaptation costs and mitigation costs. Signatories maximise joint net
beneĕts of all agreement members. As the coalition acts as one player and as all singletons are individual
players there are jN j   jSj+1 players in the transboundary pollution game. By using backward induction
we can analyse our three-stage game. erefore, the stages of our game will be described backwards.
Stage : e transboundary pollution game In this stage the levels of proactive adaptation p i are
ĕxed and the agreement of stage  has become binding for the signatories S  N . Each player i then
sets its level of mitigation qi simultaneously, where qi 2 [0, e¯ i ], where e¯ i is the regional business as usual
( ) emissions. e mitigation beneĕts for each player depend on the total level of global mitigation.
Where totalmitigation is given as the sumof all individualmitigation eﬀorts;q =
P
i2N qi . Climate change
costs consist of the sum of residual damages, adaptation costs and mitigation costs. e residual damages
(which implicitly include optimal reactive adaptation) are given by:Di (q ,p i ) = d i (e¯  q ) (1 p i ), where
e¯ represents the business as usual level of global emissions, p i denotes the individual level of proactive
adaptation (p i 2 [0,1]), and d i > 0 is a parameter that represents the marginal damages of climate change.
Proactive adaptation decreases the regional damages of climate change. Proactive adaptation can therefore
decrease the beneĕts of mitigation and vice versa; increased mitigation decreases the marginal beneĕts of
adaptation. Proactive adaptation levels are given in this stage as they are set in the ĕrst stage of the game.
e associated adaptation costs are region speciĕc and (strictly) convex and assumed to be PCi = 12 a i p2i ,
where a i > 0. e costs associated with mitigation also vary between regions and are denoted byMC i =
1
2 m i q2i , wherem i > 0.
ebeneĕts of adaptation andmitigation are the avoided damages, which are given as the damages
minus the actual damages, assuming that in the  case proactive adaptation is zero and no mitigation
measures are taken. We can now write the payoﬀs of each player i of climate change policies:
Wi (q ,p i ) = Bi (q ,p i ) MCi(qi ) PC i (p i )
= d i  (e¯ ) d i  (e¯  q )  (1 p i )  12 m i q2i   12 a i p2i
()
e payoﬀs to each player (the coalition and the non-signatories) are a function of the unique coalition
formed. Each coalition is associated with a unique optimal level of proactive adaptation and mitigation
for each player. We can now restate the payoﬀs of abatement and adaptation (Wi (q ,p i ) from equation )
as a function of the coalition formed. Here we assume that optimal mitigation levels are adopted as these
are a function of the coalition formed. We ĕnd the payoﬀs as a function of others and regional mitigation
for non-signatories :
Vi (S) = d i  (e¯ ) d i  (e¯  q (S))  (1 p i (S))  12 m i q

i (S)
2  1
2
a i p i (S)2. ()
e coalition payoﬀs represents the value of the coalition, i.e. the sum of climate policy beneĕts minus
policy costs over all coalition member regions:
VS(S) =
X
i2S
Vi (S). ()

In our model the gains of the coalition are shared among its members using the optimal sharing rule
as proposed by Weikard (). We use a sharing rule where the coalition beneĕts are shared according
to each region’s beneĕts if they choose not to join the coalition, i.e.
Vi =
Vi (S i )P
j2S Vj (S j )
VS . ()
Here there is a coalition S with members j . Member i chooses to join the coalition or not. If the region
i chooses to leave, the coalition le is denoted as S i . e beneĕts region i would receive outside the
coalition are denoted as Vi (S i ). Hence the larger a region’s outside option, the larger its share of coalition
payoﬀs will be.
An optimal sharing rule will guarantee internal stability of a coalition whenever that is at all feasible,
i.e. whenever the coalition payoﬀ equals or exceeds the sum of the outside option payoﬀs. If a coalition is
internally stable under some arbitrary sharing rule, then it is stable under an optimal sharing rule (Eyck-
mans and Finus ; Weikard ). For this reason we apply an optimal sharing rule.
Stage : Coalition formation stage e second stage of the game is the coalition formation stage.
Each region i 2 N has a choice to either join a unique  or not, as any player may join this game, it is
an open membership game. Each region i thus has a binary strategy space; i 2 f0,1g. i = 1 implies a
choice to join the unique ; i = 0 implies the choice to not join.
Stage : Proactive adaptation stage In the ĕrst stage regions set their levels of proactive adaptation
aﬀecting their beneĕts function by reducing the gross damages associated with a certain level of climate
change and hence mitigation. Here p i represents the amount of adaptation in an individual region as a
fraction of damages reduced by adaptation and p i 2 [0,1] . In this stage each region i , chooses a level of
investment in proactive adaptation that maximises its own beneĕts given the expected actions by others.
 Analysis of Optimal Proactive Adaptation in Mitigation Strategies
Stage  We ĕrst look at the last stage of the game, where the mitigation level is chosen. As the level
of proactive adaptation is chosen in the ĕrst stage, a level mitigation can be chosen in the third stage given
the level of proactive adaptation. In the ĕnal stage a region is either a singleton or a coalition member,
depending on its choice in the second stage. We will ĕrst discuss the case of a singleton.
A singletonmaximises its own beneĕts given the level of others mitigation. In that case qi is chosen to
maximise Vi , which is given as the beneĕts of climate change policies (adaptation and mitigation) minus
the costs. is is given by Equation :
Wi (p i ,q ) = d i  (e¯ ) d i  (e¯  q )  (1 p i )  1
2
m i q2i   12 a i p
2
i . ()
In the last stage of the game a level ofmitigationqi is chosen given the level of adaptation chosen in the ĕrst
stage. Note that we do not consider coalition formation just now, i.e. the coalition S is given at this stage.
e optimal level of mitigation for a singleton in the third stage for a given level of proactive adaptation
can then be derived using the ĕrst order condition:
@Wi
@ qi
= d i  (1 p i ) m i qi = 0, i =2S. ()

Here d i  (1 p i ) represent the marginal beneĕts of mitigation, i.e. the avoided marginal residual damages
and m i qi represents the marginal costs. e marginal beneĕts of mitigation are thus decreasing in the
level of proactive adaptation. e optimal level of mitigation is given by:
q i =
d i
m i
 (1 p i ), i =2S. ()
Equation  states that, for singletons, every level of proactive adaptation chosen in the ĕrst stage is as-
sociated with a particular level of optimal mitigation chosen in the third stage. Furthermore the level of
mitigation increases with the damage parameter d i and decreases with the costs of mitigationm i and the
level of proactive mitigation p i .
When a region is a coalitionmember it will choose itsmitigation level as tomaximise coalition payoﬀs.
ese beneĕts are given as the sum of the individual beneĕts of all coalition members:
WS(q ,p ) =
P
i2SWi (q ,p i )
=
P
i2S
 
d i p i  e¯  d i qi  (1 p i )  Pi2S  12 m i q2i  Pi2S  12 a i p2i  . ()
Maximising this with respect to regional abatement we ĕnd;
@Ws
@ qi
=
X
j2S

d j  (1 p j ) m i qi = 0, ()
q i =
P
j2S d j  (1 p j )
m i
=
P
j2Snfi gd j  (1 p j )
m i
+
d i  (1 p i )
m i
. ()
Comparing equations  and ,we can see that the optimal level ofmitigation of a coalitionmemberwill
be higher than for the singleton. In the singleton case only the beneĕts of mitigation (avoided damages)
to the singleton were considered. In the case of the coalition member the beneĕts to all other coalition
members are considered in addition. Furthermore, the optimal level of mitigation for a coalition member
will increase in the coalition size.
Stage  In the coalition formation stage a Nash equilibrium is given by a vector of ratiĕcation de-
cisions (i )i2N such that no single region would prefer to change its decision. A coalition S a stable co-
alition if the strategy proĕle (i )i2N that corresponds to S is a Nash equilibrium. A coalition is stable if
it is both internally and externally stable (d’Aspremont et al. ). A coalition is internally stable if and
only if for all i 2 S it holds that Vi (S)  Vi (S i ) and externally stable if Vj (S)  Vj (S+j ). Given the large
number of asymmetric regions in this game, the number of possible coalitions is large. We cannot derive
analytically for each coalition whether it is stable or not, but will use our applied model in Section . We
move on to the ĕrst stage of the game and solve the model for a given coalition.
Stage  Now we can turn to the ĕrst stage of the game to ĕnd the optimal level of proactive adapta-
tion. A region’s optimal level of proactive adaptation will depend on two factors, ĕrstly the global level of
mitigation and secondly whether and in which coalition the region will be. Hence for each coalition there
is a unique optimal level of adaptation for members and non-members. As the agreement only refers to
mitigation decisions, in the adaptation decision in the ĕrst stage, each region will maximise its own bene-
ĕts. At this stage there are no obligations to other (future) members of the coalition. We ĕrst assume that

mitigation in the third stage is given, later we deĕne the level of mitigation for each coalition, in terms of
the level of proactive adaptation.
Optimising equation  with respect to the level of proactive adaptation leads to the optimal level for
singletons:
@Wi
@ p i
= d i (e¯  q ) a p i = 0, i =2S. ()
p i (S) =
d i (e¯  q )
a i
, i =2S. ()
However when a region is a coalition member its level of proactive adaptation will aﬀect the value
of the coalition as well as the regions share of the coalition beneĕt. A coalition member’s share of the
coalition value is given byVk (S), this was deĕned in Equation .e coalitionmemberwill set his proactive
adaptation level to maximise this. Hence, the following ĕrst order condition must hold:
@Wk (S)
@ pk
=
@ V (S)
@ pk

@

Vk (S k )P
j2S Vj (S j )

@ pk
= 0, k 2S. ()
Assuming:
@
P
j2S Vj (S j )
@ pk
= 0, ()
we have:
@ V (S)
@ pk
 @ Vk (S k )
@ pk
 1P
j2S Vj (S j )
= 0. ()
furthermore:
@ V (S)
@ pk
=
@
P
j2S Vj (S)
@ pk
+
@ Vk (S)
@ pk
()
@ Vk (S)
@ pk
= d k  e¯  d k q (S) a k pk ()
@
P
j2S Vj (S)
@ pk
=
@
P
j2S Vj (S)
@ q
 @ q
@ pk
=
X
j2S
d j (1 p j )    d k
m j
()
Resulting in:
@Wk (S)
@ pk
=
0B@d k  e¯  d k qS  a k pk +X
j2S
d j (1 p j )    d k
m j
1CA  (d k  e¯  d k qS k  a k pk ) = 0. ()
p k =
P
j2S d j (1 p j )   1m j
   d k  e¯  d k qS k  1
a k d k  e¯ qS k +
d k qS  d k  e¯
a k
()
Where qS is the total level of emissions, given the coalition S, which can be written in terms of p i ,
where regions denoted by f are singletons and regions denoted by j are coalition members.
q S =
X
f 2N nfSg
d f
m f
 (1 p f )+
X
j2S
P
j2S d j  (1 p j )
m j
()

q S k =
X
f 2N nfSg
d f
m f
 (1 p f )+
X
j2Snfk g
P
j2S d j  (1 p j )
m j
()
us we ĕnd a unique level of proactive adaptation given the other regions’ levels of proactive adaptation
for both the singleton and coalition member in a speciĕc coalition. is problem is too complex to study
further in an analytical framework. Hence we develop the - model in the next section to run
empirical simulations of coalitions.
 e -Model
e original  model consists of a two-stage, non-cooperative game of coalition formation. e -
 model adds an additional stage to the  model which takes place before the two stages of
. ese three stages are in essence identical to those described in Section . is ĕrst stage is the
proactive adaptation stage where a level of proactive adaptation is chosen based on the expectation of
which coalition will form. Investments in adaptation will decrease the residual damages associated with
climate change in the future. e second stage is the coalition formation stage and the third the trans-
boundary pollution game.
e welfare of the regions in the model is based on a payoﬀ function, which represents the discounted
net beneĕts from mitigation (i.e. mitigation eﬀorts) and adaptation over the model horizon. We assume
that undiscounted beneĕts in each period depend not only on the current global mitigation level but also
on global mitigation in previous periods through reduced concentrations of ₂ and correspondingly
lower gross damage levels; in contrast, mitigation costs only depend on current mitigation levels within
the region.e level of proactive adaptation is set in the ĕrst stage but the costs and beneĕts of adaptation
are felt each period throughout the planning horizon.
We refer to the situation where none of the regions choose to join the coalition as “All Singletons;” ()
the associated optimal mitigation paths are an open loop Nash equilibrium. In the “Grand Coalition‚Ä
()ù, all regions cooperate and global marginal mitigation costs and beneĕts are equated achieving the
social optimum. If no region can receive a higher payoﬀ by diverging, i.e. by unilaterally changing its
strategy, the coalition structure is called stable. us a coalition is stable if it adheres to internal stability
and externally stability.
Emission permit trading is incorporated in the model to allow for transfers among regions in the
coalition, such that emission permits can be traded only among signatories. e transfers imply that if
a region reduces its emissions more than required for achieving the assigned emission permit level, the
region can sell permits to other signatories. e price of a permit is endogenous and equals marginal
mitigation costs (as a result of the cost-beneĕt analysis). Emission trading in the model ensures that the
global optimumwill be achieved and creates a tool to incorporate the sharing rule of a coalition.We apply
two diﬀerent allocation schemes:
. No permit trading, where each year the distribution of permits follows from the actual emissions;
i.e. no transfers are allowed.

. Incentive allocation, where permits are allocated according to an “optimal” transfer scheme that
maximises potential participation in the international agreement (Carraro et al. ; Fuentes-
Albero and Rubio ; McGinty ; Weikard ).Ƭ
.. Calibration of the -Model
e original  model was introduced in Finus et al. () and has been updated and extended to
a forward-looking speciĕcation by Nagashima et al. (). A detailed description of the speciĕcation of
the  model is given in Dellink et al. (). e  model includes twelve world regions; 
(), Japan (), European Union -  (), other  regions (), Eastern European regions
(), former Soviet Union (), energy exporting regions (), China (), India (), dynamic
Asian economies (), Brazil () and the rest of the world (). e planning horizon in the model
consists of  years, ranging from  to .is ensures a proper reĘection of the long-term aspects
of climate change, while the period for which the international agreement holds is limited. Essentially,
in  the signatories strike an agreement that sets their mitigation path until , while taking into
account all future beneĕts and costs from that mitigation path. Future costs and beneĕts are discounted
at a regional discount rate, based on region-speciĕc  growth rates and a pure rate of time preference
that is assumed to be equal across regions (cf. the Ramsey rule). Data from the  model (Paltsev et al.
) is used to calibrate regional  emission and  paths in the  model.
Beneĕts from mitigation represent avoided damages, which in turn depend on global atmospheric
temperature change. e climate system is approximated by a linear system of three equations (for con-
centrations, radiative forcing and atmospheric temperature increase, respectively) assuming exogenous
forcing from non-₂ greenhouse gases and ignoring the non-linear feedbacks between the atmosphere
and the oceans. e original damage function is calibrated such that global damages are calibrated separ-
ately from regional damage shares. is is not restrictive given the assumption in  of linear beneĕts
and it allows for the direct calibration of marginal global beneĕts from mitigation, for which much bet-
ter information exists than for regional damage estimates (Nordhaus ). e mitigation cost function
follows estimates of the  model by Ellerman and Decaux ().
Furthermore, exogenous technological progress is assumed implying an annual reduction of marginal
mitigation costs that is relatively small for the developed regions (, , , , , ) and twice
as high for the other regions; this provides an approximation of the reduction inmarginal mitigation costs
between  and  as projected by Morris et al. ().
e - model recalibrates the  damage function into a damage function consisting of
two forms of damages. e model equations of - are given in the appendix. We assume there
are damages that can be combated through proactive adaptation and damages that can be combated by
reactive adaptation.e net damages in the model are split into stock (proactive) damages and Ęow
(reactive) damages based on the empirical assessment of Agrawala et al. (). As reactive adaptation has
Ƭ e incentive-based grandfathering scheme distributes emission permits proportional to the outside option payoﬀ as described
in Equation .

Region 1 Gross stock
damages
Net
Ęow
damages

adaptation
level

adaptation
level
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
Table : Parameter values of -, where the cost and beneĕt parameters are given as a fraction of the
original net damages
no eﬀect on the coalition formation process, this form adaptation can be implicitly included in the damage
function. As we have shown in de Bruin et al. (a) and de Bruin et al. (b). this will not aﬀect the
mitigation decision in a ĕrst best world. Hence the Ęow damage part of the damage function represents the
net Ęow damages assuming optimal Ęow adaptation.e stock part of the damage function is given by the
stock gross damages which can be reduced through proactive adaptation.e level of proactive adaptation
is set in the ĕrst period for all periods, the costs and beneĕts of which are felt in each period of the planning
horizon. e costs and beneĕts of proactive adaptation are calibrated based on the empirical estimates of
AGA where each region has a unique proactive adaptation potential and adaptation cost function. We
assume a quadratic proactive adaptation cost function for each region; pci t (p i t ) = a 1i p2i t .
Table  gives the adaptation cost parameter estimates for the various regions. In this paper we focus
on three levels of adaptation, which we refer to as  adaptation,  adaptation and no adaptation. ese
levels refer to the optimal level of proactive adaptation in the All Singletons case and the optimal proactive
adaptation level in the Grand Coalition case. Both these levels are presented in Table . ese levels of
optimal adaptation refer to the optimal levels assuming there are no strategic advantages of proactive
adaptation by coalition members.
 Results
. Analysis of the Grand Coalition
e chosen level of proactive adaptation will aﬀect the payoﬀs of regions in the  and the incentives of
regions to remain in the .We examine two (extreme) levels of proactive adaptation, in which all regions
choose the same level of adaptation. Firstly, assuming that all regions simultaneously choose the  level
of proactive adaptation, i.e. the optimal level of proactive adaptation given that no coalition will form ().
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is is the highest credible level of adaptation as it coincides with the adaptation level associated with the
highest possible temperature in the model, i.e. the temperature when there is no mitigation cooperation.
Secondly, assuming that all regions simultaneously set their level of proactive adaptation at the  level,
i.e. the optimal level given the formation of the .is is the lowest credible level of proactive adaptation
as it coincides with the lowest temperature in the model (when there is global cooperation in mitigation).
Table  shows the diﬀerence in payoﬀs between the Grand Coalition and the All Singletons case for
each region with optimal transfers and with no transfers. A positive number in the table entails that a
region is better oﬀ in the Grand Coalition than in the case of All Singletons.
Region 
adaptation no
transfers

adaptation no
transfers

adaptation optimal
transfers

adaptation optimal
transfers
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 - -  
    
    
    
    
Global    
Table : Payoﬀs in the Grand Coalition with optimal transfers and without transfers in  over the time
horizon ( years) in billion 
When there are no transfers between regions, two regions are not better oﬀ in the Grand Coalition
compared to no coalition. ese regions are  and . As these regions have low marginal abatement
costs theywill have high levels ofmitigation in theGrandCoalition.When no transfers take place these re-
gions cannot be compensated for their high levels ofmitigation by other regions. In the case of no transfers
some regions have a higher gains from the Grand Coalition when adapting at the  level compared to 
level the and others not.e regions that are worse oﬀwhen  adaptation is chosen are , ,  and
. ese regions have relatively low marginal abatement costs and hence in the Grand Coalition, these
regions will have high abatement levels to compensate other regions’ damages. If regions over-adapt, by
applying the  level of adaptation, their damages will decrease resulting in a lower optimal level of global
abatement. Hence low abatement cost regions are better oﬀ when all regions over-adapt. In the case of
optimal transfers all regions are better oﬀ in the Grand Coalition  adaptation is globally optimal.
When regions choose to adapt at the  level, the diﬀerence in payoﬀs between the Grand Coalition
and All Singletons case decreases. is is a logical consequence as the payoﬀs in the All singletons case
are maximised when  adaptation is applied and the Grand coalition payoﬀs are maximised when 
adaptation is applied.
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Region  adaptation
no transfers
 adaptation
no transfers
 adaptation
optimal transfers
 adaptation
optimal transfers
 - -  
 - -  
 - -  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
Table : e incentives of regions to withdraw from the , in  over the time horizon ( years) in
billion 
e incentive of a region to withdraw from the  is given by the diﬀerence between a regions outside
option payoﬀs and its  payoﬀs. ese incentives are given in Table . In the case of no transfers, the
payoﬀs of ,  and  are higher in the , than in their outside options (i.e. have negative incentive
to withdraw); all others are better oﬀ withdrawing. e coalition surplus is thus not large enough to pay
all regions their outside option payoﬀ, making the  unstable.  and  have lower incentives to stay
in the  when  adaptation is applied than when  adaptation is chosen. is is due to the decreased
abatement under  adaptation, leading to lower payoﬀs for these regions in the . ese regions both
have high damage levels and would beneĕt in a coalition without transfers, where they would not have to
compensate other regions for their mitigation eﬀorts. Other regions have a higher incentive to remain in
the  when  adaptation is applied as this results in lower mitigation commitments in the  for these
regions. In the case of optimal transfers, a lower level of proactive adaptation ( adaptation) will lead
to higher abatement commitments in the . is, in turn, increases the free rider incentives of regions
and hence the incentives of regions to withdraw from the coalition. Even though all regions unanimously
prefer the  level of adaptation in the  (per deĕnition), applying  adaptation will in fact increase the
incentives of regions to withdraw from the coalition.
.. Analysis of Stable Coalitions
e stable coalitions that form will depend on the level of proactive adaptation chosen in the ĕrst stage.
Here we compare the stable coalitions found when regions simultaneously and uniformly set their pro-
active adaptation at either  or  levels. We only examine the case of optimal transfers. e ten best
performing coalitions are given in . e performance of a coalition is measured by the  of global
payoﬀ increases as compared to the  case. is is given as a percentage of gains from cooperation, i.e.
global payoﬀs in excess of the All Singletons global payoﬀ. e best performing stable coalition found in
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-ƭ is the coalition between , , ,  and  achieving some  of  of the gains
of the Grand Coalition. is coalition is stable when either  adaptation or  adaptation. All of the ten
best performing coalitions include either ,  or , these being the regions who contribute the
most to the gains from the cooperation (see Table ). ese mayor players form a coalition with other
regions (e.g. , , , , , ,) and compensate them for their mitigation eﬀorts.
, , , ,  ()
, , , ,  ()
, , , , ,  ()
, , ,  ()
, , ,  ()
, , , , ,  ( )
, , , ,  ()
, , , ,  ()
, , ,  ()
, , ,  ( )
Table : Ten best performing stable coalitions
 adaptation  adaptation
, , , ,  () , ,  ()
, , ,  () , , ,  ()
, , ,  () , , ,  ()
, , , ,  () , , ,  ()
, , ,  ()
, , ,  ()
Table : Unique stable coalitions to the diﬀerent levels of adaptation, where the performance of the coali-
tion is given between brackets
e stable coalitions that are found with the two levels of adaptation are similar, but there are some
diﬀerences. When regions choose the  level of adaptation more stable coalitions form ( versus ).
is is because as the beneĕts of cooperation decrease (when more adaptation takes place) they are more
likely to be stable (Barrett ). However, several stable coalitions form in the case of  adaptation that
do not form in the case of  adaptation, as  adaptation increases the damages of regions, increasing
their incentives to join a coalition.e stable coalitions unique to each adaptation level, are given in Table
.
Examining Table , we can for example see that the coalition between , ,  and  is stable
when  adaptation is applied but not when  is applied. In contrast, the coalition between , ,
,  and  is stable with  adaptation but not when  adaptation is applied. When adaptation
decreases  wants to join the coalition between , ,  and  making it externally unstable.
ƭ Note that in , the best performing coalition is that between , , ,  and  achieving slightly higher per-
formance than the coalition between , , ,  and  (Nagashima et al. ). However, when explicitly including
adaptation and setting it at either the ,  level or at the level optimal in this speciĕc coalition, this coalition becomes unstable.
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is is because as adaptation decreases the damages in  increase to such a degree that it becomes
worthwhile for  to join the coalition. e same is valid for  where the coalition between , ,
 and  becomes externally unstable under  adaptation as wishes to join it. Furthermore, when
adaptation is lower, a coalition is stable between three of the main players, i.e. ,  and . is
coalition is not internally stable in the  case as the damage levels in  and  are too high, resulting
in high levels of mitigation for .  has an incentive to leave this coalition and free ride on the others’
mitigation. However, when the damages of  and  are limited through a higher level of adaptation
the coalition becomes beneĕcial to  and hence the coalition is stable in the  case.
. Analysis of the Best Performing Stable Coalition
To get a better understanding of the strategic role that proactive adaptation can play, we now consider
what eﬀects a unilateral divergence of coalition members would have on their payoﬀs in the best per-
forming stable coalition (the coalition between , , ,  and ). Firstly, we examine the case
where regions, when deciding their level of adaptation in the ĕrst stage of the game, adapt at the  level.
Secondly, we assume that regions in the ĕrst stage expect that no coalition will form and adapt at the 
level.
Diverging
region
Diverging
region
payoﬀs
Coalition payoﬀs
excluding diverging
region
Coalition
payoﬀs
Singletons’
payoﬀs
Global
payoﬀs
* . -. . -. -.
 . na -. . .
 . na -. . .
 . na . . .
* . . . . .
 . na . . .
 . na . . .
* . -. . -. .
* . -. . -. .
* . . . -. .
 . na . . .
 . na -. . .
Table : e diﬀerence in payoﬀs in percentage in the case of unilateral over-adaptation ( by diverger
and  by others) for the best performing coalition, where coalition members are denoted by *
Looking at the ĕrst case, i.e. when a singleton unilaterally increases its proactive adaptation to the
 level while the other regions’ adaptation remains at the  level. We refer to this as unilateral over-
adaptation. Table  presents the changes in payoﬀs in the best performing stable coalition for the di-
verging region, for all coalition members excluding the diverging region, for all coalition members, for
all singletons and for all regions (global payoﬀs). Examining the case of unilateral over-adaptation by a
singleton, we see that over-adaptation results in higher payoﬀs for the diverging singleton. e diverging
region increases its adaptation level and reduces itsmitigation level, while themitigation of others remains
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Diverging region     
 . -. -. -. -.
 -. . . . .
 -. -. . -. -.
 -. -. -. . -.
 -. -. -. -. .
Table : Percentage change in outside option payoﬀs due to unilateral over-adaptation ( by diverger and
 by others)
the same, on balance increasing its payoﬀs. e payoﬀs to the other players, and thus also to the coalition
decrease as themitigation level of the diverging region has decreased.e total singletons payoﬀs increase
due to the diverging region’s increased payoﬀs.e total global eﬀect is in most cases negligible, but in the
case of larger regions ( and ) slightly positive. Note that though global payoﬀs increase in the case
of divergence by ( and ), environmentally the world is worse oﬀ as less mitigation is undertaken.
When a coalition member diverges and over-adapts, this region again beneĕts, for the same reasons
as above. e beneĕts of divergence are, however, larger for coalition members than singletons. By over-
adapting a diverging coalition member can increase its outside option payoﬀs, as shown in Table . By
increasing its outside option payoﬀs, it increases its share in the division of the coalitional surplus of
coalition members. In this way, due to the sharing rule of the coalition, the diverging region can increase
its coalition payoﬀs. From Table  we see that the payoﬀs of the other coalition members decrease while
total coalition payoﬀs increase. Furthermore, when a coalition member diverges, total singleton payoﬀs
decrease as themitigation level in the coalitionwill decrease. In the case of a divergence by  the negative
eﬀect on other regions outweighs the positive eﬀect for  and the global payoﬀs decrease.  is a major
player with high damages, increasing its adaptation by diverging will decrease the level of mitigation in
the coalition to such a degree that global beneĕts decrease.
e results for under-adaptation and over-adaptation are symmetric in this speciĕcation and coali-
tion.Ʈ In the case of unilateral under-adaptation, the diverging region sets adaptation at  while all other
regions set their adaptation at the  level. When a region diverges, its payoﬀs decrease. As mitigation
levels remain the same a reduction in adaptation decreases the diverging region’s payoﬀs. As the diver-
ging region applies more mitigation to compensate for the lower level of adaptation, all other regions
beneĕt.
.. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we undertake a sensitivity analysis of our results. We ĕrst examine the potential role of
strategic over-adaptation. We then set proactive adaptation at the level optimal for singletons in the best
Ʈis result is due to the fact that the best performing coalition is roughly halfway between the  and the  in terms of gains and
our model is linear. erefore, any diversions from the optimum in either way will have symmetric eﬀects. us the unilateral
beneĕts of over-adaptation are the same as the costs of unilateral under-adaptation. Furthermore, the eﬀect on other regions’
payoﬀs is symmetrical.
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performing stable coalition ( level) and examine what eﬀect that will have on the best performing
coalition stability and the results concerning over and under-adaptation.
Diverting re-
gion
Diverting re-
gion payoﬀs
Coalition
payoﬀs ex-
cluding
diverting
region
Coalition
payoﬀs
Singletons’
payoﬀs
Global pay-
oﬀs
* not stable
 -. na -. -. -.
 -. na -. -. -.
 -. na -. -. -.
* -. -. -. -. -.
 -. na -. -. -.
 -. na -. -. -.
* -. -. -. -. -.
* -. -. -. -. -.
* -. -. -. -. -.
 -. na . -. -.
 -. na -. -. -.
Table : Diﬀerences in payoﬀs in percentage in the case of unilateral extreme over-adaptation: all regions
apply  adaptation, diverting region applies of  adaptation, where coalitionmembers are denoted
by *
Global *    *   * * *  
-. . -. -. -. -. -. -. -. -. -. -. -.
Table : Diﬀerences in payoﬀs in percentages between new best performing coalition (with unilateral
extreme over-adaptation of ) and original best performing coalition
In Table  the payoﬀs of a unilateral divergence to  of the  level are given. In this case regions
over-adapt by a large amount. e extra costs of adaptation outweigh the beneĕts of increased coalition
payoﬀs and decreased mitigation for most regions. Over-adaptation furthermore will result in lower mit-
igation levels by the diverting regions, which has a negative eﬀect on the payoﬀs of all regions. When 
diverges the best performing coalition is no longer stable as the  has no incentive to join this coalition
anymore. e new best performing coalition is then that between , , ,  and . e new
coalition includes  in the place of . Hence the burden of compensating the low mitigation cost
regions for their mitigation eﬀorts in the coalition will shi from  to . e diﬀerences in payoﬀs
compared to the previous best performing coalition are given in . All other regions are worse oﬀ due to
the decreased level of mitigation, were speciĕcally the  looses with a payoﬀ decrease of .  .e
payoﬀs for  increase by nearly . . Hence by setting its proactive adaptation level extremely high,
the  can inĘuence the coalition formation process and cause a new best performing coalition to form
which is more beneĕcial to the .
e assumption that regions either choose  or  adaptation is somewhat ad hoc. We therefore,
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now look at what the eﬀects are of unilateral divergence when other regions adapt to the level optimal
in the best performing coalition. When the level of proactive adaptation is chosen which is optimal for
the level of temperature change in the best performing coalition ( level), this coalition remains stable,
and indeed best performing.is level of proactive adaptation is the level which a singleton would choose
given the best performing stable coalition. Hence expecting that the best performing coalition will form
and adapting accordingly will result in the best performing stable coalition to indeed be stable.We assume
that coalition members set their level of adaptation to be optimal for the degree of temperature change
associated with that coalition, i.e. they do not consider the secondary beneĕts of changes in coalition
beneĕts and their share therein, but choose their adaptation level as a singleton would given this coalition.
e rationale for this assumption is that at stage , regions cannot be sure which coalition will emerge in
stage . Again one region at a time diverges to either a higher level of adaptation,  adaptation or a lower
level of adaptation,  adaptation.
Diverting re-
gion
Diverting re-
gion payoﬀs
Coalition
payoﬀs ex-
cluding
diverting
region
Coalition
payoﬀs
Singletons’
payoﬀs
Global pay-
oﬀs
* . -. . -. -.
 . na . . .
 . na -. . .
 . na . . .
* . . . . .
 . na . . .
 . na . . .
* . . . -. .
* . . . . .
* . . . . .
 . na . . .
 -. na . -. .
Table : e diﬀerence in payoﬀs in percentage in the case of unilateral over-adaptation ( by diverter
and  by others), where coalition members are denoted by *
Table  shows the changes in payoﬀs when regions unilaterally under-adapt. Here the results do not
are similar to the results of Table  and of similar magnitude.
In Table  the eﬀects on payoﬀs of unilateral over-adaptation are given, assuming other regions adapt
at the best performing stable coalition level. e results for the payoﬀs of the diverting regions are similar
to the previous results of Table . However, these eﬀects are smaller as the divergence, i.e. the diﬀerence
between the divergers’ adaptation and the other regions’ adaptation is less. Here divergence by a coalition
member has ambiguous eﬀects on the payoﬀs of other coalition members.
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Diverting re-
gion
Diverting re-
gion payoﬀs
Coalition
payoﬀs ex-
cluding
diverting
region
Coalition
payoﬀs
Singletons’
payoﬀs
Global pay-
oﬀs
* -. . -. . .
 -. na . -. -.
 -. na . -. -.
 -. na . . .
* -. . . . .
 -. na . -. .
 -. na . . .
* -. . -. . .
* -. . -. . .
* -. . -. . .
 -. na . . .
 -. na . -. .
Table :e diﬀerence in payoﬀs in percentage in the case of unilateral under-adaptation ( by diverter
and  by others), where coalition members are denoted by *
 Conclusion
is paper investigated the role of proactive adaptation in mitigation coalition formation. Game theory
literature has studied the formation and stability of coalitions, but does not include adaptation in these
analyses. is paper introduces adaptation into a three stage cartel game of coalition formation. Adapta-
tion can be divided into two categories, namely reactive and proactive (anticipatory) adaptation. Reactive
adaptation takes place aer climate change occurs and hence any threat of higher or lower levels of adapta-
tion will not be credible. Proactive adaptation, on the other hand, takes place before climate change occurs
and before coalition formation and hence can change the payoﬀ function for a region and its position in
a coalition. Proactive adaptation may thus have an eﬀect on coalition formation and stability.
In this paper we, ĕrstly, analytically derived the optimal level of mitigation and proactive adapta-
tion for both the singletons and coalition members. We can, however, only determine these levels for a
given coalition. We therefore introduced the - model which is constructed based on the 
model but includes a proactive adaptation decision. is model combines game theory and Integrated
Assessment Modelling to create an applied three-stage cartel formation model. is model consists of 
heterogenous regions and simulates all possible coalitions () and checks all coalitions for internal and
external stability.
Using - we, secondly, investigated how diﬀerent levels of adaptation will aﬀect the Grand
Coalition (where all members join the coalition) payoﬀs. We ĕrst assumed two levels of adaptation for
illustrative purposes, namely  adaptation and  adaptation.  adaptation refers to the optimal level of
proactive adaptation for singletons associated for singletons with the Grand Coalition temperature path.
 adaptation refers to the level of optimal proactive adaptation in the All Singletons case (i.e. when no

coalition is formed). We found that when no transfers take place low abatement cost regions such as 
and  will beneĕt more when all regions adapt at the  level as opposed to the  level, whereas other
regions do not.e reason is straightforward: with higher adaptation levels these regions have to mitigate
less. With optimal transfers the beneĕts of the Grand Coalition can be shared across regions and low
marginal abatement cost regions can be compensated for their high levels of abatement. Hence in the case
of optimal transfers all regions are better oﬀ when  adaptation is applied.
irdly, the incentives to withdraw from the Grand Coalition were examined. ough payoﬀs are
higher when  adaptation is applied in the Grand Coalition, incentives to withdraw are also higher than
in the  case. As adaptation decreases, mitigation in the coalition will increase resulting in higher mitig-
ation costs for coalition members and hence higher incentives to withdraw from the Grand Coalition.
Fourthly, we examined how the diﬀerent levels of proactive adaptation ( and ) will aﬀect the
stable coalitions formed. We saw that with higher levels of adaptation, the damages of regions are limited,
making speciĕc coalitions stable. On the other hand lower levels of adaptation increase damages, giving
incentives to certain regions to cooperate whose damages were too low with high adaptation.
Fihly, we examined the best performing stable coalition and what strategic eﬀect proactive adapt-
ation may have. A coalitions performance is measured in the percentage of the gains from cooperation
captured by the coalition. e best performing stable coalition in the - model is the coalition
between , , ,  and , achieving  of the potential cooperation gains. We investigated
the eﬀect of unilateral over-adaptation assuming that all regions adapt at the  level and one region di-
verts to the  level.We saw that diverting regions beneĕt from this, while all other regions lose (due to the
lower mitigation level in the diverting region). Furthermore, the increased beneĕts of diverging coalition
members are higher than those of singletons as a coalition member can increase its outside option payoﬀ
by over-adaptation, this in turn increasing its share of the coalition beneĕts.
When we assumed all regions adapt at the  level and one coalition member diverts to the  level,
hence under-adapts, we saw the opposite eﬀects: the diverting region loses, and the others all gain. When
assuming that the other regions set their level of adaptation to the optimal level for the best performing
stable coalition, we saw roughly the same results but the eﬀects were of a smaller magnitude.
Furthermore we found that certain countries can inĘuence the stability of the best performing stable
coalition, by going beyond the credible level of adaptation and over-adapting extremely. When  ex-
tremely over-adapts ( of  adaptation) the best performing stable coalition is no longer stable and
hence will not form.e new best performing stable coalition creates larger beneĕts for , where 
takes the place of  and hence the burden of compensating mitigation eﬀorts by other coalition mem-
bers.  can thus extremely over-adapt to ensure the formation of a larger coalition, thereby increasing
its gains.
emain conclusions of this paper are that adaptation will aﬀect both the incentives to join the Grand
Coalition and the stable coalitions. Furthermore, excessive adaptation can be strategically applied by re-
gions to gain higher (coalition) payoﬀs.is is done at the cost of the othermembers.ough these eﬀects
are small, they nonetheless show that proactive adaptation can aﬀect coalition formation.
ere are several limitations to this analysis. Firstly, we only investigate several level of proactive ad-
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aptation (and only unilateral divergences) and do not identify a Nash equilibrium where each region
optimises its proactive adaptation given the expected outcome of the second stage of the game.. is next
step is le for later research. Secondly we do not consider uncertainty in our model. irdly, our results
are dependent on our parameter estimates which are based on the limited empirical literature on the costs
and beneĕts of adaptation and mitigation. is work would beneĕt from better estimates on the exact
eﬀects of climate change, adaptation and mitigation.
.A - model equations
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Radiative forcing
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= F M t +F non2t ()
Temperature change
Tt

Tt 1,Ft

= (1 T ) Tt 1+T  Ft ;T0 = T2010 ()
Gross damages
gdi t (Tt ) = i  (D Tt ) Yi t ()
Residual damages
rdi t (p i t ,Tt ) = gdi t (Tt )  (1 p i t ) ()
Beneĕts of mitigation
mb i t (p i1, ...,p i t ,qt ) =
1X
s=t
¦
(1+ ri s )t s   rdi s (p i s ,qt = 0)  rdi s (p i s ,qt )© ()
Mitigation costs
aci t (q i t ) =
1
3
i  (1 &)t q3i t + 12 i  (1 &)
t q2i t ()

.A. - model equations
Adaptation costs
pci t (p i t ) = a i p2i t ()
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